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Merrill: Uniformly Correct Construction of Uniform Laws

Uniformly Correct Construction of Uniform Laws*
By Maurice H. Merrill**
Wide support could be mustered for the proposition that the necessity for judicial interpretation and application of statutory law has
made draftsmanship one of the most hazardous of human vocations.
Bishop Hoadly probably was not the first to discover that the interpretative process establishes the scope and the effect of the legislator's product.1 It is a skilled scribe indeed who can write so clearly that all must
agree as to the "plain meaning" of his product. Yet the acceptance of the
legislative process as the principal device for the improvement of law
requires the judges to make every effort to discover and to effect the
purpose of the framers of statutes.
The need for concern with the purpose of draftsmen is true particularly of the measures enacting proposals for uniform state laws
prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. By definition, these measures are intended to make uniform
the laws of the enacting states. Hence it is highly desirable that the
first construction of a provision in such an act be followed when the same
question arises in other jurisdictions. 2 Otherwise, to quote the well-chosen
words of the then Mr. Justice Hughes, "we shall miss the desired uniformity, and we shall erect upon the foundation of uniform language
'3
separate legal structures as distinct as were the former varying laws."
If this deference to the first judicial construction is to be an acceptable
practice, however, every effort must be made to ensure that the original
decision correctly embodies the purpose of the draftsmen. Long and
careful attention is given to the task of framing these acts. Considerations of policy are debated with great care. The views of those whose
interests are affected by the proposal are solicited and are taken into
account in the formulation of policy and of phrasing. An erroneous
interpretation, if it is followed elsewhere, defeats all this painstaking
effort.
*Reprinted from AiERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, June 1963. The Uniform Com-

mercial Code is the product of more than a decade of careful study and meticulous
drafting by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute. Now adopted in twenty-three states, including Montana,
the Code is well on its way to becoming the commercial law of the United States.
Professor Merrill's article is a plea for a uniform judicial construction of the Code;
nothing is gained, he points out, unless the first court to consider a point arising
under the Code decides the point in accordance with the intent of the drafters, and
it is of equal importance that subsequent decisions be in harmony. The article points

out the various sources to which lawyers and judges may go in their efforts to obtain
uniform interpretations.
**Research Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma.
'See the Bishop's words as quoted in Gray, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW,
102, 125, 172 (2nd ed. 1921).
'See discussion, with citation of authorities, in Crawford, STATUTORY
§§236, 347

(1940);

CONSTRUCTION,

Sutherland, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §5211 (3d

ed. 1943).

'Commercial Nat. Bank v. Canal-LouisianaBank, 239 U.S. 520, 528, 60 L. ed. 417, 421,
36 S.Ct. 194, 197 (1916). In a comment inspired by this decision, 29 HARV. L. REV.

541 (1916), there is a recital of the extent to which the ideal of conformity in the
construction of uniform laws had been ignored by the courts to that date.
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Moreover, an erroneous reading invites departures from the principle
of uniformity in construction. Counsel, convinced of the rightness of their
client's cause, cannot be expected tamely to admit the propriety of an
opposing decision from another jurisdiction. Earnest presentation of the
allegedly erroneous foundation of the inconvenient precedent frequently
will bring a decision sustaining orthodoxy as against heresy and,
incidentally, bringing victory to the client. Right thus may triumph, but at the expense of uniformity. 4 Yet it will not do to accept the
counsel of despair voiced by one judge: "Actual uniformity in the law
• . . will remain a dream more or less iridescent; substantial uniformity
is all that can be hoped for." 5 If the objectives sought by the uniform
law program are to be attained, judges must heed rather the adjuration
of Mr. Justice Thompson of Illinois, written more than forty years ago,
that "the court of all the states should keep in mind the spirit and
object of the law, and should give to the language of the act a natural
and common construction, so that all might be more likely to come to
'6
the same conclusion."
This need for uniform and correct interpretation and application is
imperative, especially with respect to the decisions which the courts in
the several states will be called upon to render in litigation arising under
the new Uniform Commercial Code. The reasons are numerous. They
readily should be apparent to everyone. The Code is of tremendous
magnitude,' covering all aspects of commercial law. One of the major
factors leading to the project for its drafting was the extent of the disharmony in the decisions rendered under the various existing uniform
acts on commercial subjects which the Code supplants. 7 The drafting
work continued over more than a decade of careful study and meticulous
examination. Amendment of the product to cure the effect of errors in
construction will be difficult.9 The Code is well on the way to adoption
throughout the United States. With every new adoption, this difficulty
of curative amendment will increase. Uniformity of interpretation and
application is of the utmost importance to the commercial community.
Indeed it is of transcendent concern to us all, since our well-being is
bound up so inextricably with the efficient functioning of the complex
machinery of national and international trade. 10 In many areas, the Code
'See Merrill, Nebraska Suretyship-IV, 10 NEB. L. BuL. 261, 298 (1932), for an ac-

count of the diversity engendered by misconstruction in one area covered by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. In connection with this discussion, note the
erratum set forth at 10 NEB. L. BuL. 449 (1932). Cf.: "It is a cardinal principle in
the interpretation of uniform laws that the courts of the different jurisdictions should
follow the rule of uniformity so as to make their decisions harmonize. In the present
case, it is impossible to follow this principle, as the authorities upon the question involved are not in harmony." State Trading Corp. v. Rosen, 126 Conn. 36, 9 A.2d
289, 290 (1939).

5

Porter, J., in Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 78, 116 Pac. 239, 241
(1911).

OSee National City Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 300 Ill.103, 107, 132 N. E.
832, 833, 22 A.L.R. 1153, 1156 (1921).
T
See Witherspoon, Why a New Commercial Code?, 54 Cou. L. J. 291, 292 (1949);
Malcolm, Background and Reasons for the Code Project, 39 ORE. L. REv. 318, 319
(1960).
8See Braucher, Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COL. L. REV.

798 (1958), for a comprehensive summary of the work.
'See Schnader, The New Commercial Code, 36 A.B.A.J. 179, 180 (1950).
"See Epton, The Uniform Commercial Code, 21 OKLA. B. A. J. 799, 800 (1950); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367 (1957).
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deals with aspects of commerce not heretofore subjected to statutory
guidance, at least on a uniform basis." For all these reasons, it is imperative that the first decision on each point arising under the Code be in
accordance with the intent of the body which drafted and promulgated
it. It is of equal importance that subsequent decisions, in the same or
in any other jurisdictions, be kept in harmony with the original, correct
interpretation. This must be the primary aim of every court that is called
upon to deal with the Code.
What special resources are available to aid in the proper construction of uniform laws? Frequently, of course, there will be a more or less
extensive collection of law review articles written by persons having to do
with the preparation of the drafts. 2 More significant, there are comments and annotations, in part prefatory to each draft and in part on a
section by section basis, prepared by the several drafting committees.
These commissioners' notes, as they arc commonly termed, are prepared
with great care. Frequently, in the course of debate in the Conference, if
there is any doubt at all as to how particular language should be construed or applied, the drafting committee is advised to deal with this
problem in the annotation. Sometimes there is positive direction from
the Conference that this be done. The commissioners' notes are available
in the pamphlets published by the Conference embodying the several acts,
in the annual handbook of the Conference for the respective years in
which the various drafts were approved and promulgated and in the
very helpful set entitled Uniform Laws Annotated.'3
Courts have resorted to these commissioners' notes for aid in the
construction of uniform acts on various subjects. The list of uniform
acts so treated, as to which citations are available, embodies those dealing with the subjects of contribution among tortfeasors, 14 fiduciaries,' 5
conditional sales, 16 expert testimony, 7 property, 8 and divorce recognition.' 9 These annotations have a stronger claim upon judicial attention
than the explanations of voluntary, unofficial drafting groups concerning their proposals, useful as some courts have found such explanations
"The articles by Messrs. Schnader, supra note 9, and Witherspoon, supra note 7, emphasize this point.
2For
the Uniform Commercial Code, see the extensive bibliography assembled in Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Commercial Code, Volume 1, pages 2-7.
"This work also is a quick source of citations showing what construction, if any,
already has been made with respect to the problem at hand.
"Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W. 2d 648 (1943); Bumph v. Lester Land Co.,

205 Ark. 1147, 172 S.W. 2d 916 (1943); Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp.
13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

"Colby v. Biggs National Bank, 67 App. D.C. 259, 92 F. 2d 183, 114 A.L.R. 1065
(1937); New Amsterdam Gas. Co. v. National Newark and Essex Banking Co., 117
N.J.Eq. 264, 175 Atl. 609 (Chan. 1934), affd. on opinion below, 119 N.J.Eq. 540, 182
Atl. 824 (Err. & App. 1936).
"People's Savings and Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527, 250 N.W.
384, 88 A.L.R. 1306 (1933).
17Tinney v. Cosby, 112 Vt. 95, 22 A. 2d 145 (1941).
nEllingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 264, 95 N.W. 2d 635 (1959).
"Dahlberg v. Englund, 45 Wash. 2d 708, 277 P. 2d 717 (1955). The commissioners'
notes were cited by the writers of the majority and the dissenting opinions, both. It
must be conceded that the dissent used the notes with keener perception.
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to be. 20 A closer analogue would be the definitive statement of a commission officially appointed to study and to report upon a particular

problem. The reports of such bodies are resorted to with great frequence as guides to the construction of statutes enacted in response

to their recommendations. 21 But the National Conference of Comnmissioners on Uniform State Laws is made up of delegates officially appointed and commissioned from each state. The commissioners from
each state therefore have legal standing as advisers to the respective
legislatures. When their drafts are adopted by the legislative bodies,
their explanatory discussions, therefore, should have a standing equivalent to those of a commission officially appointed to draw a bill"2 or of a
body, such as the New York Law Revision Commission, which drafts
specific proposals for legislation, 23 or, indeed, of a committee of the
legislature itself, in charge of a particular proposal. 24 The comments of

all such bodies customarily are resorted to as guides for the interpretative process. Because of these considerations, the case for resorting to
the commissioners' notes as guides to the construction of uniform acts
is especially compelling.
Since the Uniform Commercial Code is the joint production of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the
American Law Institute, the authoritative discussions appended thereto
are termed official comments rather than commissioners' notes. They
represent the common labors of both organizations. They are especially
detailed and helpful. Originally, one section of the Code specifically
authorized consultation of the official comments "in the construction
and application of this act" with the limitation that "if text and comments conflict, text controls. '25 For a variety of reasons, this provision
was eliminated. One of the best of the reasons was that, because of the
line of authorities already cited, this sort of provision is unnecessary
surplusage. It is to be hoped that the judges will form the habit of
consulting the official comments whenever they are confronted with a
problem of construction under the Code. There are heartening signs
26
that this is becoming an established judicial practice.
"°The explanations of bar committees which drafted revisions of particular statutes
have been deemed "persuasive"
although not necessarily "authoritative''. In re
McCombs Estate, 80 N.E. 2d 573 (Ohio Prob. 1948); Houston Bank 4 Trust Co. v.
Lee, 345 S.W. 2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (DAP).
nConnecticut Rural Roads Impr. Assn. v. Hurley, 124 Conn. 20, 197 Atl. 90 (1938);
Weiss v. Leonardy, 160 Fla. 570, 36 So. 2d 184 (1948); Lewis v. Smith's Estate, 130
Ind. App. 390, 175 N.E. 2d 390 (1959); Morris 4 Essex Inv. Co. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 33 N.J. 24, 161 A.2d 491 (1960); County of Erie v. City of Buffalo,
4 N.Y. 2d 96, 149 N.E. 2d 208 (1958).
'In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934).
'See Field, The Commission and the Courts, 40 CoRN. L. Q. 656, 662, 663 (1955), and
the cases discussed at that point.
"4Two recent cases exemplifying the long-and well-established resort to committee reports as aids to interpretation are Territory v. Morita, 41 HAw. 1 (1955) and Sorlien v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureaus, 84 N.W. 2d 575 (N.D. 1957).
"Uniform Commercial Code (1952 Ed.) §1-102 f.
"Representative instances are afforded by In re Eton Furniture Co., 286 F. 2d 93 (3d
Cir. 1961) [§ 3-401 (1)]; Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett 4- Co., 297 F. 2d 497 (1st.
Cir. 1962) [§ 2-207] ; Durkin v. Siegel, 340 Mass. 445, 165 N.E. 2d 81 (1960) [§ 3508] ; Industrial Packaging Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging International, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 161 A. 2d 19 (1960) [§ 9-303]; Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194
Pa. Super. 503, 168 A. 2d 600 (1961) [§§2-403, 9-307]; First National Bank v.
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Commissioners Can Aid the Court
Another resource is available to judges faced by countervailing contentions of counsel as to the meaning of a uniform law. The court properly may summon to its aid in an amicus curiae capacity one or more of
the state's commissioners on uniform state laws, or, for that matter, nonresident commissioners. There is sound precedent for such judicial use
of neutral friends in aid of the administration of justice. 27 The public
character of the commissioners' position makes it improper for them to
tender to the judges their advice as to pending litigation, thus voluntar.
ily ranging themselves on one side or the other. On the other hand, it
manifestly is proper for them, as public servants, to respond to a request
by the court for impartial assistance. The desirability that the court
seek this aid as a matter of common practice is emphasized by the
testimony of an eminent judge of long experience that counsel frequently fail not only to cite pertinent decisions elsewhere, but also to
28
recognize the policy back of uniform legislation.
The resources which the commissioners, when acting as invited
amici curiae, could bring to the service of the courts are many. Those
commissioners who have participated in the consideration of the particular statute will be familiar with the background and purpose of the
language employed. They will be fully apprised of its "legislative
history" within the Conference. In this respect they have a basis for
especially authoritative advice to the courts. All commissioners will have
a quicker path to the literature and the authorities in the field than is
open to the ordinary lawyer or judge. Also, the debates and proceedings
in the consideration of the draft by the Conference will be available
to them. These produce light adapted to the solution of interpretative
problems comparable to that afforded by the records of legislative proceedings. Unfortunately, they are not readily available to the general
public, but the commissioners have access to them, and, through this
access, may assist in the solution of difficult questions of construction.
In the interest of more effective use of uniform acts, and, in particular, of the Uniform Commercial Code, let us hope that judges will
resort, more and more, to the special interpretative aids that are available
to them.

Anderson, 7 Pa. D. & C. 2d 661 [§3-305]; Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v.
Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. (No. 1), 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351 (C.P. 1956) [§2-401];
De Graff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 19 (C.P. 1957) [§2-318]; Erb v.
Stoner, 19 Pa. D. & C. 2d 25 (C.P. 1958) [§§9-108, 9-204].
27
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375, 99 L. ed. 1161, 75 S. Ct. 814 (1955) (oral argument, when counsel appointed for appellant by court below could not appear); Whitney v. Randall, 58 Ida. 49, 70 P. 2d 384 (1937) (briefing of a question on which
both parties took an identical position); In re Arszman, 40 Ind. App. 218, 81 N.E.
680 (1907) [approved, State v. Gorman, 171 Ind. 58, 85 N.E. 763 (1908)] (hearing
on application for liquor license); McCoy v. Briegel, 305 S.W. 2d 29 (Mo. App. 1957)
(child custody proceeding, appointment by court to present matters of fact and law
deemed of interest).
"See Rossman, Uniformity of Law: An Elusive Goal, 36 A.B.A.J. 175, 178 (1950).
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